Awanish Kumar
Courtsey: http://www.pragoti.in/node/4623
The elections for the BrihanMumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) were held on 16th February 2012. The Shiv Sena-BJP-RPI alliance won 106 out of 227 seats of the corporation and emerged as the single largest coalition. The coalition remains short of the majority mark of 114 seats and needs to attract few independent winners. The Shiv Sena won 75, BJP 30 and RPI one ward in the elections. On the other hand, Congress won 48 seats and NCP got 18 seats. Raj Thackeray’s MNS was victorious in 28 seats; while the Samajwadi Party got 9 seats.
Much has been said about the turnaround of Shiv Sena-BJP-RPI alliance during the elections. There were at least three strategies that helped the SS-BJP-RPI alliance. The first strategy was successful stitching of the alliance itself and smooth seat sharing. The second strategy was an aggressive campaign presenting achievements of the last corporation- the “we did it” campaign. Finally, the last minute appearance of Bal Thackeray to address rallies across the city and Shiv Sena’s reconciliatory position towards Muslims and north Indians. As an aside, while RPI could only win one ward, it helped transfer its Dalit votes to Shiv Sena-BJP. The Shiv Sena-BJP votes did not go to RPI which shows that the traditional Shiv Sena-BJP voters remain uncomfortable voting for a Dalit party. The division of “secular” votes has been held to be the major reason for Congress’s resounding defeat.
The MNS which began its political career on the issue of “Marathi Manoos” and the Samajwadi Party won 7 seats each in the 2007 BMC elections. In 2007 elections, Shiv Sena had won 84 seats and BJP 28 seats. In 2012 polls, Shiv Sena came down to 75 and BJP increased its tally to 30 seats. The Congress and NCP fought the 2007 BMC elections separately and won 75 seats and 14 respectively. The Congress won only 48 seats in 2012 and NCP performed marginally better at 18 seats.
Significantly, the MNS stood second in 56 wards and third in 20 wards while Samajwadi Party emerged second in 11 wards in 2012 elections. Most of the wards where SP won are located in Govandi, Kurla and Dharavi- the slum regions of the city. In effect, the MNS either won or remained at second position in 84 wards. The corresponding figure for SP stands at 20 wards. This implies that out of total 227 seats, 104 wards had either MNS or SP as winners or at the second place. In this respect, the MNS and SP are the principal beneficiaries of 2012 BMC elections. This calculation, though unimportant in the current elections, might serve as a signal for emergent political situation in the city of Mumbai.
It is not merely the quantitative significance of MNS and SP influencing almost half the seats in BMC but their challenge to Shiv Sena and Congress as the masters of older polarizations in the city. One, the MNS has attracted votes from conventionally Shiv Sena supporters. To the extent that all 7 wards in Dadar area and substantial number of wards in Mahim, both traditionally Shiv Sena-BJP strongholds, went to MNS. Additionally, the MNS not only broke the “cultural” superiority of Shiv Sena-BJP in the upper caste Marathi speaking communities of Mumbai but also affected the old social and economic networks of money and muscle (“nuisance”) power. Two, the MNS has received votes from Congress votebanks of Muslims and other non-Marathi segments of the Mumbai municipal electorate. Finally, the SP has consolidated its strength in slums and Muslim localities of the city while cornering votes that usually went to the Congress party, namely Muslims and north Indians.
Many others have commented on the performance of the MNS and Samajwadi Party in the elections. However, it has not been viewed together as one singular unit in the polarized and fragmented polity of Mumbai. The argument, here, is an extension of the standard understanding that extremist formations in polarized political situations feed and strengthen each other notwithstanding the fact that they may fight against each other, mostly on streets and sometimes in popular imagination. The data from the elections show that if MNS tends to become the sole bearer of “Marathi Manoos”, the Samajwadi Party would be recognized as the party of north Indians and Muslims. It is not only subdivision and consolidation of constituencies but alienation of ‘insiders’ as well as ‘outsiders’ from the democratic spirit of political processes.
In spite of the above, it can well be argued that the motivations of voters in Mumbai’s diverse settlements and communities are varied which cannot be simplified to the binary extremes of MNS and Samajwadi Party. On the other hand, the global and increasing polarization in Mumbai’s politics around the twin extremes of “Marathi Manoos” and “outsiders” cannot be denied. The ironic aspect of such identity politics is that while it privileges one identity over another in its self-referential framework, it simultaneously creates competing “others” who, in turn, consolidate their cultural selfhoods and political identities against the previous identity group. This kind of identity politics might seem as a simplification exercise for its proponents and target population/electorate but it is ever-narrowing and leads to dangerous terms of political mobilization in its dynamic phase. The threat ‘perception’ among both extremes in one period leads to larger consolidation in the next period.
The example of simultaneous intensification of the Hindutva and Islamic right wing in the country is a reminder that we tend to forget. The city of Mumbai might not be on the brink of an all-out street riots again but the divisions and subdivisions in its mindscape can certainly be witnessed through the results of BMC elections. The right lesson must be drawn by liberal and progressive forces and they must work towards larger integration of the “outcastes” and “outsiders” of the city by raising issues beyond ethnicity and towards equality.
Much has been said about the turnaround of Shiv Sena-BJP-RPI alliance during the elections. There were at least three strategies that helped the SS-BJP-RPI alliance. The first strategy was successful stitching of the alliance itself and smooth seat sharing. The second strategy was an aggressive campaign presenting achievements of the last corporation- the “we did it” campaign. Finally, the last minute appearance of Bal Thackeray to address rallies across the city and Shiv Sena’s reconciliatory position towards Muslims and north Indians. As an aside, while RPI could only win one ward, it helped transfer its Dalit votes to Shiv Sena-BJP. The Shiv Sena-BJP votes did not go to RPI which shows that the traditional Shiv Sena-BJP voters remain uncomfortable voting for a Dalit party. The division of “secular” votes has been held to be the major reason for Congress’s resounding defeat.
The MNS which began its political career on the issue of “Marathi Manoos” and the Samajwadi Party won 7 seats each in the 2007 BMC elections. In 2007 elections, Shiv Sena had won 84 seats and BJP 28 seats. In 2012 polls, Shiv Sena came down to 75 and BJP increased its tally to 30 seats. The Congress and NCP fought the 2007 BMC elections separately and won 75 seats and 14 respectively. The Congress won only 48 seats in 2012 and NCP performed marginally better at 18 seats.
Significantly, the MNS stood second in 56 wards and third in 20 wards while Samajwadi Party emerged second in 11 wards in 2012 elections. Most of the wards where SP won are located in Govandi, Kurla and Dharavi- the slum regions of the city. In effect, the MNS either won or remained at second position in 84 wards. The corresponding figure for SP stands at 20 wards. This implies that out of total 227 seats, 104 wards had either MNS or SP as winners or at the second place. In this respect, the MNS and SP are the principal beneficiaries of 2012 BMC elections. This calculation, though unimportant in the current elections, might serve as a signal for emergent political situation in the city of Mumbai.
It is not merely the quantitative significance of MNS and SP influencing almost half the seats in BMC but their challenge to Shiv Sena and Congress as the masters of older polarizations in the city. One, the MNS has attracted votes from conventionally Shiv Sena supporters. To the extent that all 7 wards in Dadar area and substantial number of wards in Mahim, both traditionally Shiv Sena-BJP strongholds, went to MNS. Additionally, the MNS not only broke the “cultural” superiority of Shiv Sena-BJP in the upper caste Marathi speaking communities of Mumbai but also affected the old social and economic networks of money and muscle (“nuisance”) power. Two, the MNS has received votes from Congress votebanks of Muslims and other non-Marathi segments of the Mumbai municipal electorate. Finally, the SP has consolidated its strength in slums and Muslim localities of the city while cornering votes that usually went to the Congress party, namely Muslims and north Indians.
Many others have commented on the performance of the MNS and Samajwadi Party in the elections. However, it has not been viewed together as one singular unit in the polarized and fragmented polity of Mumbai. The argument, here, is an extension of the standard understanding that extremist formations in polarized political situations feed and strengthen each other notwithstanding the fact that they may fight against each other, mostly on streets and sometimes in popular imagination. The data from the elections show that if MNS tends to become the sole bearer of “Marathi Manoos”, the Samajwadi Party would be recognized as the party of north Indians and Muslims. It is not only subdivision and consolidation of constituencies but alienation of ‘insiders’ as well as ‘outsiders’ from the democratic spirit of political processes.
In spite of the above, it can well be argued that the motivations of voters in Mumbai’s diverse settlements and communities are varied which cannot be simplified to the binary extremes of MNS and Samajwadi Party. On the other hand, the global and increasing polarization in Mumbai’s politics around the twin extremes of “Marathi Manoos” and “outsiders” cannot be denied. The ironic aspect of such identity politics is that while it privileges one identity over another in its self-referential framework, it simultaneously creates competing “others” who, in turn, consolidate their cultural selfhoods and political identities against the previous identity group. This kind of identity politics might seem as a simplification exercise for its proponents and target population/electorate but it is ever-narrowing and leads to dangerous terms of political mobilization in its dynamic phase. The threat ‘perception’ among both extremes in one period leads to larger consolidation in the next period.
The example of simultaneous intensification of the Hindutva and Islamic right wing in the country is a reminder that we tend to forget. The city of Mumbai might not be on the brink of an all-out street riots again but the divisions and subdivisions in its mindscape can certainly be witnessed through the results of BMC elections. The right lesson must be drawn by liberal and progressive forces and they must work towards larger integration of the “outcastes” and “outsiders” of the city by raising issues beyond ethnicity and towards equality.
